UK-EU Negotiations should Start by Clearing the Fog


The tone of Teresa May’s letter to Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, invoking the EU’s Article 50 to leave the EU is reminiscent of the old adage “Fog in the Channel. Continent isolated”. There is also a lot of fog around the debate in the UK especially as to what the EU’s Single Market actually means, despite the fact that the Single Market is largely a British invention. Mrs Thatcher wanted to spread her free market philosophy across the EU and to do so agreed with the then president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, that a British expert, Lord Cockfield be appointed is Single Market commissioner to implement the Single European Act enacted by all member parliaments in 1986 which provided for majority voting to overcome resistance in countries like Germany and France where regulation of services, especially financial services, was devised in deference to the cartel power of big companies to keep out foreign companies.


Markets have to be regulated

It is often thought that a free market means a market unregulated by law. In fact a free market can only exist under the rule of law. A tragic example of not understanding this was the advice given to the Russian government by Western economists immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 to go for rapid privatization and deregulation. Deregulation in the UK and US had always been a misnomer, since under Mrs Thatcher more new legislation was passed than in any previous equivalent ten year period and the US has and remains one of the most legalistic countries in the world. But it was applied literally to Russia with the result that it became a kind of Wild East with massive new wealth and massive new poverty and unbridled corruption.

Adam Smith, the original protagonist of free economic markets, himself strongly believed in the rule of law to regulate its participants and ensure competition. He once said that rarely do men of commerce get together even for a purely social gathering than it ends up in a conspiracy against the public. So the point of the Single Market is that the rules that regulate commerce are the same throughout the participating countries so that one country’s laws cannot act as barriers to another country’s companies from trading there. Most of these rules are to those not involved in the particular sector technical and seemingly of relatively little consequence. But added together they can make the difference between an open market with a level playing field or one with a tilted playing field or sometimes even one with effective barriers to entry.

If the logic of this argument is accepted then it is should be clear that the objective of the minister for exiting the EU, David Davis, that the UK should end up with the same access to the Single Market as a participant in the Single Market can never be met however much all sides might want that. There is room for debate over much UK companies would be disadvantaged within the EU (and EU companies within the UK) but no possibility that they would not be disadvantaged at all. There is a possible approach the UK could take which would make something like an associate participant in the Single Market but that would mean Teresa May reversing her statement that the UK would not be part of any bits of the EU and would be completely untouched by EU law.  Norway is formally a participant in the Single Market but is technically not subject to decisions of the European Court of Justice but rather a special Court of Arbitration for the so called European Economic Area. However this still means it has to implement the decisions of the Court of Arbitration, decisions which themselves have to take account of the ECJ’s judgments.


A deep partnership cannot exist without participation in bits of the EU

Both the UK and EU-27 are taking over-rigid approaches which make any agreement keeping the UK and the EU close together in what Mrs May has envisaged as “a deep and special partnership” impossible, unless the two sides are willing to change. Mrs May said that the UK is leaving the EU completely without remaining parts of any “bits” of the EU but a real partnership should involve being part of “bits” of it. For example there is an overwhelming case from the UK’s point of view, to remain part of the research and innovation policies which give grants for joint research and innovation programmes in which institutions or companies from two or more different countries collaborate. The UK is host to more such activities than any other EU member state. Other non-EU countries are involved in these policies so UK participation without being a member of the EU should be possible.

The letter invoking Article 50 said that failure would hurt security cooperation which some saw as a threat not to collaborate informally. The government however said it related to existing EU policies on Justice and Home Affairs of which Mrs May when home secretary favoured “opting in” even though it had the choice then to opt in or opt out. If she does as implied intend to favour continuing to be part of such policies that amounts to being part of “bits” of the EU.


EU-27 claim that Internal Market is indivisible not backed up by precedent

The EU-27 has not clarified its stance on the UK playing a part on such EU policies perhaps because the British government has not made any formal requests so far. However on the matter of the Internal Market the EU-27 stance is that the market is indivisible so if the UK insists on controlling the movement of labour it cannot be part of the Market. Given that immigration, which is linked to but not the same as free movement, was the most important reason for the Leave vote in the UK referendum, it is politically essential for the UK government to win concessions on the issue. There are however precedents for the Market not being indivisible. Norway is in theory considered fully part of the Market but has its own policies for agriculture, fisheries and oil and gas extraction and production, all of which impact on the Market. Switzerland goes further by having sectoral agreements which effectively make it part of the Market in some areas, although not the key one of financial services. Even within the EU, provinces of Austria can limit investment in property, so that holiday resorts are not bought up by foreigners, provided such restrictions apply to people from other provinces in Austria. The UK can argue that it has taken, and is likely even outside the EU to continue to take more net immigration from EU countries, than most other EU member states do. It can also point out that migration where it becomes permanent has a deeper impact on a country’s society than the other three forms of movement. It could point out that Estonia now has a movement to reduce emigration.

As free movement of labour is indeed one of the four pillars of the Internal Market along with goods, services and capital, taking complete control of movement of labour would make it difficult to justify enjoying the advantages of the other three. However, it would not be reasonable in any fair partnership for the UK to insist on the right to select only those who are most desired which would imply having had the most spent on them by the other EU countries on education and training. Moreover it is evident that the UK needs immigrants for its health service, its care services, the hospitality and catering sector and research and technology. An agreement which effectively allows the UK to participate at least in parts of the EU Internal Market should therefore be possible.

UK government resistance to Court’s role must be modified if any progress is to be made

The UK government has however also made a big issue over the role of the EU’s Court of Justice (ECJ). This is a major issue for the minority of Conservative members of parliament who have always campaigned to leave the EU, but it is doubtful whether more that 2 or 3 per cent of the UK electorate could mention a single judgment of the Court which they do not like. It has also played an essential role in opening EU markets and it is not possible any international trade agreement including the World Trade Organisation without some form of arbitration. In addition to its role in the Internal Market, the ECJ also has a role in policies on cooperation on crime and security. The UK government will therefore need at least to modify its position on the ECJ if it really wants “a deep and special partnership”. It should look carefully at what issues it thinks that ECJ decisions have or could affect UK sovereignty in a way that actually matters to the electorate. It may as with Norway be possible to replace it in theory with another court but it would not be possible to pretend that such a new court would be ignore ECJ decisions.

Much has been made as to how long the negotiations will take and that they may overrun the two years envisaged in the EU Treaty’s Article 50 and the UK has argued that it wants talks on the future relationship to start before the thorny issue of settling financial accounts is complete. That is a reasonable request, but the UK will have to make a big change to the stance which it takes in some of its statements if the talks a to have a chance of achieving much more than a zero tariff agreement in non-agricultural goods. The EU-27 should also  be prepared to be more flexible than at present on participation in the Internal Market.

2017 will be risky year for EU (less the UK) but there are also reasons for hope


The year 2017 will be an eventful and important year for the EU. The expectation that the UK will set in motion in March a process to leave the EU in two years is a blow – the first time that a full country has decided to leave the EU (Greenland an autonomous region with a link to Denmark had previously left) and one that might suggest the possibility of further countries leaving. The immediate aftermath of the UK according polls conducted by the German Bertelsmann Institute was a strengthening of pro-EU feeling in all other countries and there does not appear to be any country with a majority in favour of leaving the EU. Nevertheless there are strong movements in many remaining member states which are either in favour of outright departure or want to weaken the EU; there is also increased opposition to euro membership in Italy.

With the governments of all other major countries either weak or unstable and with many of their economies still struggling, Germany has in recent years played a leading role, and this will be even more the case in 2017 with the UK having decided to leave. The coming election there in September is likely to see the Christian Democrats re-elected as the largest party and therefore the leading party in a coalition, which could be again with the Social Democrats (SPD) or other parties. Whatever the criticisms made of her, Angela Merkel as the unchallenged leader of the CDU will very probably be re-appointed as chancellor.


Italy with caretaker prime minister faces election by March 2018

Within the euro zone Italy had since Matteo Renzi became prime minister in 2014 had a stronger and for Italy relatively long-lasting government. For a time Renzi seemed the most effective leader after Merkel, but he resigned in December as a result of a badly misjudged referendum on constitutional reform. If the overall aim of the reform – to change Italy’s costly and unwieldy bicameral system – was a good one, details were flawed and it became associated with a separate electoral reform, which could have given excessive power to the largest party even if it had well below majority support. In addition, having promised to resign as prime minister if he lost, Renzi had to do so. As a result Italy faces a new period of political instability with elections likely in 2017 and necessary by March 2018. There is a possibility that the Five Star Movement (M5S) might come to power. It can be described as populist but is not as anti-immigrant as other populist movements. It has said that it would have a referendum on euro membership. The leader, Beppe Grillo, is hyper-critical of the other main parties, particular the Democratic Party (PD), which is still led by Renzi, but M5S’s own performance in city governments has been mixed and particularly poor so far in Rome.


Spain with new minority government stages economic recovery

Spain, following a year with only a caretaker government, now has one led by the previously incumbent right-of-centre Popular Party (PP), which has been given conditional support by the opposition Socialists (PSOE) and opposed by the newer and more left wing Podemos, as well as being challenged by Catalan nationalism. In the last year the economy has finally, seven years after its collapse in 2008-09, staged an impressive recovery with over half a million extra jobs created in 2016. This seems likely to continue meaning that despite political difficulties Spain is no longer a weak link in the euro zone.


First 2017 elections to take place in Netherlands

Elections will take place in the Netherlands in March when the performance of the virulently anti-Muslim party the PVV led by Geert Wilders will be watched. Netherlands’ governments have always been coalitions but the other main parties have said they will not form a coalition with the PVV. Such a strategy may seem right in principle but has the disadvantage that the PVV has been becoming the main opposition.


French elections in May should lead to stronger president

The next major EU elections in 2017 will probably be those for the French president and parliament in May. At present there are three leading candidates each with about a quarter of likely votes according to opinion polls: Marine Le Pen leader of the Front National, Francois Fillon, the choice of the right of centre, and Emmanuel Macron, a centrist who was minister in the Socialist government before resigning to declare his independent candidacy. President Hollande is not standing. The Socialist Party is holding a primary to choose its official candidate but none of the potential official Socialist candidates looks likely to rival Macron. Macron has been making speeches emphasizing his difference with Le Pen by giving full-hearted support to the EU and declaring that France should be open and multi-cultural. Fillon on the other hand may try to win over potential Le Pen voters by being more sceptical of the EU (though not in favour of a referendum on it) and appealing to identity politics. He has also called for drastic cuts in the size of the public sector, one of the largest in Europe relative to the economy, by reducing state employment by half a million. As a declared admirer of Mrs Thatcher, he may also pursue policies which increase inequality. Even if these succeed in helping the development of private sector enterprise,they could increase the number of people who feel left out and so could be vulnerable to Le Pen.

At the moment opinion polls suggest that in the second round of presidential elections between the two leading candidates in the first round, assuming Le Pen comes first or second, that either Fillon or Macron would win by between 60 and 65% of the vote against 35-40% for Le Pen. Given the surprise Leave vote in the EU and the Trump victory in the US, there is no room for complacency that this apparently comfortable lead will be reflected in the final vote.

If Fillon or Macron can win by a reasonably strong majority his government will at least for a time have the potential to be a near-equal partner with Germany led by Merkel, a role that President Hollande has not been able to fulfill. Unlike Hollande, both Macron and Fillon argue that difficult and painful reforms are needed to revive the French economy and to strengthen the fiscal position. They are not therefore setting themselves up for a dramatic decline in support when it becomes apparent that they cannot meet promises made during the campaign as happened with Hollande.


Merkel likely to remain chancellor after September election

Germany’s election takes place, as is traditional there, in September. The far-right party, the Alternative fur Deutschland, at present polling at 13%, is less of a threat there to the mainstream parties than similar parties are in the many other EU countries, despite the bold decision of Angela Merkel to welcome over a million refugees in 2015. Still, the far-right will for the first time in post-Second World War Germany have seats in the federal parliament, and its presence there is likely to be quite significant.

If she can hold the far-right opposition to its present level of support, Merkel is likely to achieve another convincing electoral victory. Her ability to remain an authoritative but not authoritarian chancellor after 13 years in the post is remarkable but at present she faces no major challenge from any competitor for the post. Germany led by Merkel has been a lynchpin of stability and liberal multi-culturalism in the EU as a whole.


Criticism of Germany’s fiscal policy are valid but should not be exaggerated

On the other hand Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schauble, has been accused of dictating harshly restrictive monetary and fiscal policies which have served its interests more than its euro area partners. Schauble is the second most powerful figure in German politics. His popularity means that Merkel would find it very hard to overrule him and risk provoking his resignation.

In fact the monetary policy of the European Central Bank, in promising if required unlimited intervention to keep key countries in the euro area and keeping interest rates close to zero has been highly criticized both by Schauble and by the Bundesbank. In fiscal policy Schauble has largely got his own way which has is in some respects been excessively harsh, especially in still refusing to write off un-repayable Greek and Portuguese debt and being unwilling to take into account the pressures on Italy’s public finances by the need to tackle the bulk of the cross-Mediterranean migrant flow in the last 12 months and suffering severe earthquakes. On the other hand, German policy has been consistent with holding the euro area together, and, whatever happened the post-2008-09 crash period would have been a difficult one inside the euro area as it has been outside the euro area. While some criticisms of German policy are justifiable it is not helpful to suggest that the difficulties of other countries should be solved more in Germany than domestically. Ireland has for several years shown that a euro zone crisis country could recover and in 2016 Spain recovered with the addition of over half a million extra jobs.


Role of EU institutions is important but likely to remain low profile

Given the upsets in the UK and the US in 2016 and the substantial support for right wing populist parties in many EU countries there are clearly risks that the cohesion of the EU apart from the UK. However, there are also grounds for hope that it can hold together despite both internal strains and unpredictable policies of the US and Russia, as well as the possibility of large new flows of refugees via Turkey or Libya. The ability to do so depends primarily on what happens in member states. The performance and decisions of the EU institutions, the Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice are important in the longer term but it is unlikely that they will do anything in the coming 12 months which has a decisive impact on the EU’s prospects. Following the departure of the Socialist Martin Schulz to return to German politics, the new president of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani a member of the centre-right European Peoples’ Party is likely to have a lower profile. The European Commission, headed by Jean-Claude Juncker, has kept a generally low profile and is likely to do so.

One delicate issue is how far to go in criticizing authoritarian governments in Poland and Hungary for actions that seem to come into conflict with commitments made at the time of EU entry on principles like the independence of the judiciary. Overall, the EU institutions are unlikely to and should not push for more power since this could provoke a backlash in countries other than the UK  but they will still have important roles to play in keeping the EU functioning in very difficult circumstances.

Italy’s referendum and the Brexit vote: a comparison

Parallels have been drawn between the June 23rd UK referendum on leaving the EU and the December 4th Italian one on domestic constitutional changes. Do such links have any validity?


Both attracted voters who wanted to protest specifically against the government and generally against the political class. As a result they both gave opportunities for tub-thumping anti-establishment politicians, such as Nigel Farage and Beppe Grillo to increase their profile.

The campaigns for the winning side in both cases included a very wide disparity of political opinions from the far left to the far right and many opinions between the two.

The result of both votes was a negative-not to be part any longer of the EU and to reject proposed constitutional reforms. Neither gave any idea of what the alternative might be, in the case of the UK what the future relationship with the EU would be, and in the case of Italy how the constitution might be reformed although there is widespread agreement that some reforms are needed.

Both led to the resignation of prime ministers and thereby created concerns over political stability.


The Italian referendum was a domestic one, not one about its international relations. There are possible implications for Italy’s position in the EU as Renzi though highly critical of actual EU policies is fundamentally pro the EU and the euro, while one opposing group the Lega Nord is anti-EU while another the Movimento 5 Stelle is ambiguous about the EU and wants a referendum on euro membership. Nevertheless the euro and the EU were far from being uppermost in voters’ minds and any possible impact on these is only speculative at this stage.

The UK referendum was a voluntary choice of David Cameron whereas Matteo Renzi had according to the country’s 1948 constitution to get endorsement for his proposed reforms to that constitution because he only had simple majorities in both houses of parliament for the reforms. He would have needed two-thirds majorities to avoid the need for a referendum. However, Renzi did make the choice to package several reforms in one referendum and also to put his own job on the line thereby personalizing the referendum.

While Cameron chose subsequently to resign as a member of parliament and thereby to end his political career Renzi could still play an important role in the future.

Domestic repercussions of the vote will probably be less than those from UK referendum

We know that beyond the change of prime minister, the UK referendum has already had major implications for all political parties. It led immediately to a challenge to the leadership of the main opposition party, the Labour Party and although Jeremy Corbyn was subsequently re-elected by a large majority of the membership, the divisions within the parliamentary party have not been mended.

It is clearly possible five months after the UK referendum to know more at the political impact on the UK that two days after the Italian referendum. But there are at present no firm reasons to suppose that the consequences will go beyond the replacement of the prime minister. An election must in any case take place by March 2018. The result of that election was and remains highly uncertain but the departure of the prime minister could as easily help the Partito Democratico as hinder it since Renzi’s popularity had fallen sharply over the last 12 months. It is at present not known whether he will stay as leader of the PD. Even if he does his profile will be lower and he will have little choice but to adopt a more compromising approach. Renzi’s fall is indeed important but its impact on political stability is likely to be less dramatic than many commenters perceive. Italian governments have lasted little more than a year on average over the last 60 years.

 There is no direct impact on position in EU and any indirect impact is speculative

The referendum is only important for the EU insofar as it may prove bad for the pro-euro PD. At present its main competitor is M5S, which, if at the head of the government, could pull Italy out of the euro. Such a scenario after the next election is a possibility but that was so before the referendum. Because M5S proved able to motivate voters against the reforms and against Renzi does not mean that it will be able to motivate them to the same extent in favour of M5S and its leader, the comedian Beppe Grillo at a general election.

Some commentators have at times suggested that leaving the euro would imply leaving the EU but this would only be the case if the other leading members of the EU decided in effect to expel Italy, which is not likely. M5S is not calling for Italy to leave the EU.

A small piece of good news for the EU: the agreement with Canada

Although there are 16 million people in the UK who voted to remain in the EU and would do so again even amongst them there is a feeling that things are going badly not just for the UK but for the other 27. So a piece of good news that the governments of all 27 countries and some country important regions have agreed to an ambitious new agreement on overall economic relations with Canada (although parliaments still have to ratify it). The difficulties with Wallonia shows that this kind of region (almost a country, since Belgium is little more than the shell of a country) has to be taken seriously but in this case they were preferred to negotiate rather than destroy the deal.


Deal is opposed by some on the left

There has been an ongoing campaign against the deal by leftwing campaigners in several countries whose comments plucking emotional rather than rational strings curiously echo those on the right who have campaigned against the EU in the UK. They claim that social and environmental standards are being sacrificed to the interests of multinationals but provide very little argument to back this up other than concerns which are legitimate but should not be deal-breaking on the tribunal intended to arbitrate on possible disputes between companies and governments. The principles in the agreement are very similar to those applying in member states and the EU itself namely that governments can introduce legislation to secure any social, environmental or other public policy goal, but such measures should not be grossly disproportional to their stated objectives, should not discriminate against companies from other countries compared to domestic companies, and should not amount to expropriation without compensation; in the latter case companies can be taken over by the state but fair compensation is required as in all EU member states and as is reasonable given that most companies include large shareholdings of pension funds insurance companies etc.


Dispute resolution will remain an issue

The problem is how to resolve disputes if companies or governments complain that the other party is not abiding by the above principles. In the case of many countries the courts of the country should be able to resolve disputes fairly but it seems that there is not sufficient confidence that this would always apply. So an arbitration panel has been agreed on. An important concession is that cases will be held in public not in secret. However there is probably no way of ensuring with absolute certainty that the method (or any method) of choosing judges is such as absolutely to exclude the possibility of any bias.

What is certain is that the deal and how it works out in practice will remain subject to scrutiny and debate but that if it is to be effective the sovereignty of the EU and its member states on the one hand and Canada on the other will be compromised. If the UK wishes to have as open economic relations with the EU, or indeed with Canada, it will have to compromise its sovereignty.

What Future for the EU of 27?

Echoes of UK anti-EU opinion are found in the 27

The UK was never a lynchpin of the EU and the immediate effect of its vote to leave has been to strengthen pro-remain opinion in other countries. However, there are strong anti-EU sentiments in many member states and there is a notable lack of solidarity amongst the 27 in facing current issues, so there is no room for complacency. The British desire to blame the problems of modern life on “Brussels bureaucrats” has echoes in many other countries and there are strong parties which like UKIP play on nationalism “we against them” in France, Netherlands, Germany and many other countries. But at present emotions in the 27 are stirred almost entirely against would-be immigrants or asylum-seekers from outside the EU, particularly Muslims, partly because except in Germany there is less movement of intra-EU labour into any of the 27 than into the UK. Moreover no other country has any equivalent of the UK’s anti-EU press (Sun, Daily Mail, Daily Express and Daily Telegraph).


A divide remains between east and west

There are two fault lines through the EU-27, that of the former divide between communist eastern Europe and western Europe and that between north and south. The one between east and west reflects the fact that there is much less ethnic diversity in the east and consequently a fear of the consequences of any immigration from outside Europe and the ability of their societies to cope. This explains why there has been such strong resistance to any refugee quotas despite the fact that the numbers being asked of them are tiny compared with the million refugees taken in by Germany in 2015.  Two eastern European countries, Hungary and Poland, have also witnessed a worrying retreat from principles such as independent judiciary and a free and diverse press, which were part of the criteria for their entry to the EU, although the Polish Law and Justice Party is having to contend with a loss in popularity.


Another is between north and south

The second divide is across the euro zone where southern countries are struggling with high debt and stagnant economies, while Germany and some smaller countries are doing much better economically and have their public finances under tighter control. (France is only partly a southern country but does have some of the same problems.) It may well be the case that some of their difficulties would have been mitigated had southern countries not joined the euro zone at the start as this led to rising public and private borrowing from 2000 to 2008 encouraged by low interest rates and excessive confidence. But that does not mean that anything would be gained by breaking up the euro zone now. Croatia which is not in the euro zone has similar problems to countries that are in the zone. Short term growth might be achieved by currency depreciation and monetary accommodation of the consequent inflation but at some inflation would have to be brought under control. The labour market problems notably in Spain and Portugal existed before joining the euro. In Spain there was a big rise in employment after 2000 but much of the increase was due to the excessive boom particularly in construction backed by private sector borrowing. The recession in Spain brought about a big rise in public borrowing to a country whose public finances had been exemplary. In contrast Italy, Portugal and Greece were all crippled by high public debt already before the introduction of the euro.


Germany has taken role of disciplinarian

Germany has acted as a strict disciplinarian, not because it is trying to exercise power but because it believes that is the right policy for all countries and essential for the stability of the euro zone. It acknowledges a mea culpa in breaking the fiscal rules which Germany itself had insisted on as a foundation of the currency union in 2002-03 which undermined efforts to promote fiscal discipline in other countries during years of relatively strong demand. It has reacted by trying very hard to impose very tight fiscal discipline on itself, perhaps excessively especially in prioritising such discipline over infrastructure repair and improvement. It has a point in not excluding investment from fiscal targets since this can result in unnecessary investment, which will not lead to increased revenue in the future. It should, however, engage in debate on prioritising investment that is either going to become essential soon in the future or which can bring in revenue through fares, road tolls or other charges.


Renzi would like more flexibility

At present, the government of Matteo Renzi in Italy can claim to be the main spokesperson for southern Europe, given that his government has by Italian standards lasted a long time (just over two and a half years) and the next largest country, Spain, has been without a parliamentary-backed government for the whole of this year. But he is holding a referendum on December 4th on major constitutional reforms designed to produce a less costly and more effective parliament. He had earlier said he would resign if the reforms are defeated although he has recently been reticent about this. The reforms can be criticized in detail but are part of a wider reform programme that is trying to bring about changes that have long been recommended by organisations like the OECD, IMF, the European Commission, and indeed Germany, to reduce the cost of public sector administration while safeguarding key services like health and education, reduce regulatory and tax disincentives to establishing new businesses or increasing their size by hiring more employees. Renzi is straining at the leash of the fiscal rules to, on the one hand, try to help companies take on more employees by reducing labour taxes and the other to boost public investment; one need is to rebuild after the earthquake around Amatrice in August with buildings able to withstand future earthquakes.


On refugees Germany is closer to Italy and Greece than to many other countries

Despite tensions on fiscal policy, Germany is actually closer to Italy and to Greece in that both southern countries are like Germany struggling to take a degree of moral responsibility for the migrants risking their lives in crossing the sea. In the case of those coming to Italy a substantial number are from sub-Saharan Africa. In some cases they are fleeing from war or terrorism instigated by Boko Haram or other insurgents but where only a limited part of a country is so affected they should in theory be able to be returned to another part of the country. However, the process is costly and difficult and should perhaps be accompanied by financial aid. In Greece most migrants are from countries to which return is impossible. Germany is provided some financial aid to Greece to help it make living conditions bearable its many asylum seekers who are no longer able to continue to another country.


In the end EU will survive only if it can act as a community

Although aspects of the EU involve a legal framework of rules and enforcement, an equally important aspect is that it is a community of nations trying to act together and share political and ethical objectives. In a way it is a pity that the word Community was replaced by Union in the organisation’s title by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. In any case, the EU’s leaders should not forget that acting as a community remains essential to its effectiveness and possibly its survival and that not everything can be done through rules or joint institutions, for which there is little appetite amongst public opinion in most member states.


Guest article by Mina Toksoz: Erdogan has used coup attempt to crack down on perceived opponents but may not be as strong as it may appear

It was the army that stopped the military coup

The majority of the coverage of the failed Turkish military coup, and the rhetoric from Turkish political leaders suggested it was defeated by the Turkish people on the streets in support of democracy — some responding to the call from the minarets others to their reason. But that was not really the case. It was the Turkish army that stopped it just as it was General Umit Dundar, commander of the first army in Istanbul, who advised President Erdogan to leave his Marmaris hotel which was attacked soon after.

The top ranks of the Turkish army “stayed loyal” to the President as relations between them has improved over the past year as the President’s policies came in line with military’s objectives: hard line on the PKK in place of the peace process, policy of defeating ISIS replacing the previously ambiguous attitude, making up with regional ally Israel and toning down the hostility to Russia for a more constructive stance on Syria. With the exception of differences over the Kurdish issue, this is also in line with Europe and US thinking. Hence came the statements of Western government support for the elected government of President Erdogan and against the coup attempt despite the subsequent dismay over the deep purges taking place. EU in particular needs Turkey to ensure the refugee deal that is critical to maintain political stability in Europe. That President Erdogan is prepared to accommodate to EU demands despite the instability caused in Turkey by the 3million (and rising) Syrian refugees shows that the two sides need each other.

But President Erdogan’s position is not as strong as it may appear. The curt statement published hours after the General Chief of Staff had contained the coup pledged allegiance to the “demokratik hukuk devleti” –  democratic state based on the rule of law. This may not be empty rhetoric as the army still sees itself as the guardian of the secular Turkish Republic.

Turkish Parliament put on rare show of unity

President Erdogan’s authoritarian direction is also set to continue to clash with the democratic aspirations of the Turkish people and the defence of democracy by its political institutions –parliament, media, political parties, business associations, that were amply illustrated during the coup attempt. The Turkish Parliament (Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi) showed a rare show of unity on the weekend pledging their allegiance to the sovereignty of the people vested in the Meclis. As the coup unfolded Friday night, MPs from all parties rushed “to keep the lights on” in Parliament and stayed put even when the building was bombed releasing a joint statement condemning the coup. However, the debate in the special session next day revealed the deep polarisation in Turkish politics. While Prime Minister Yildirim of the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) blamed “foreign interests who try weaken Turkey” with the nationalist-right MHP (Nationalist Action Party) Chairman Bahceli pointing to the Gulen movement as orchestraters of the coup, the centre left focused on domestic issues. The chairman of CHP (Republican Peoples’ Party) Kilicdaroglu called on MPs to work harder to strengthen democracy while the deputy head of Kurdish-left HDP (Peoples’ Democracy Party) Baluken warned that without a political solution to the ongoing conflict in the south-east, threats to democracy remain high and more military coups cannot be ruled out. These divisions were reconfirmed two days later in the debate on the 3-month emergency rule the government proposed which was passed with the support of the MHP despite CHP and HDP voting against.

Although inspiring, the scene in the Meclis was overshadowed by the action on the streets where President Erdogan spoke to his supporters. He now sees the opportunity – a Godsend, as he put it, to try to push forward the constitutional changes for an executive presidency. The government has rapidly instigated wide-ranging purges of the army, judiciary, the bureaucracy and even academia to increase its grip over the country that could further weaken the checks and balances of Turkish political institutions.

Turkish people have seen all this before, especially after the 1980 coup that had split the country between right and left. Now it is more complex. A left-alternative has only a faint echo in the CHP and HDP who –given the electoral system in Turkey, are unable to win elections, although some 40% of the electorate vote for them. On the right the vote is split between the MHP, which is in crisis as its politics has been increasingly appropriated by the AKP. Supporters of AKP are mostly people who had been left behind by the Kemalist regimes. They have been given voice by President Erdogan whose politics is a Turkish/Islamic version of Trump, Farage and other present day populist figures who thrive on crises.

Politics to drive economics

The political developments of last weekend have economic consequences. The living standards of the AKP political base improved significantly over the past decade as the Turkish economy grew rapidly. But incomes have largely stagnated since their 2008 levels. The coup attempt and the ongoing political purges is seen as increasing risks for international investors and the terror attacks are discouraging tourists. This will reduce the vital foreign exchange inflows to meet Turkey’s big external financing needs – the economy’s Achilles heel. This could continue to weigh on the lira increasing refinancing risks for the highly indebted corporate sector. The rating agencies Fitch and Moody’s warned of risks to Turkey’s investment grade rating if institutions are further weakened.

The treasury—with bureaucrats having the experience of the 2001 debt crisis, have kept a tight grip over fiscal policies. But there is a major risk that the budget discipline is loosened in order to stimulate growth to bolster political support for President Erdogan’s bid for executive presidency. Monetary policy was already suffering from political pressure for easing, although the sharp fall in the lira since the coup attempt and the inevitable uptick in inflation, led the Central bank to cut interest rates less than had been expected.

The Turkish economy is still strong with a resilient banking sector, a dynamic and diversified manufacturing, and is supported by the low oil prices and rock-bottom international interest rates. The economic authorities responded swiftly and decisively to the political shock with emergency liquidity measures and Economics minister Zeybekci promised to push on with measures to raise Turkey’s low savings rate and reduce its vulnerability to external shocks. Business welcomed the emergency rule with the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce stating “exceptional times require exceptional measures”. Domestic investors are so far standing firm. As the lira collapsed, retail depositors rushed to sell foreign exchange (some $6-7bn since the beginning of the week) and buy lira providing a domestic hedge and containing the depreciation. The weaker lira could help rebalance the Turkish economy to reduce its dependence on imports. But for currency movements to have lasting impact, they must be accompanied by deeper reforms with a longer term horizon and a business environment based on the rule of law to attract investment. However, increasingly, policy is having to focus on the short term and fire-fighting repeated domestic and international crises in the context of weakening rule of law. Meanwhile the purges are likely to trigger a major brain drain from the country. This will deplete expertise in the economy and the bureaucracy, and risks weakening policy flexibility in response to changes in global conditions. Hence the outlook for the country has become more fragile. But for 22-hours, the Turkish people and its battered institutions held together to defend democracy and showed an alternative way forward for the country away from coups and authoritarianism.


Referendum should not be accepted as fair democratic process but where do Remainers go from here?

Four reasons why the referendum lacks legitimacy:

We Remainers are told we should accept the result of the referendum with good grace and start thinking optimistically about the future of an isolated Britain (or England and Wales) hankering after the glories of its imperial past. There are actually four reasons why the referendum lacks legitimacy each one of which on its own would be sufficient on its own.

it undermines parliamentary sovereignty

Clem Attlee, the prime minister who created the National Health Service and greatly strengthened the welfare state said that referendums are “devices for demagogues and dictators” a phrase which was strongly endorsed by Mrs Thatcher in 1975. (To my knowledge she never did a U-turn on the matter.) Attlee it should be said was against the UK joining the forerunners of the present EU. While one can never know what a historical figure would have thought about present issues the best assumption is always that he or she would still have the same opinion so Attlee would still have thought joining the EEC in 1975 was a mistake and would have wanted to leave. But he also would have kept his opinion on referendums so he would have deplored the use of a referendum for this as for other purposes.

The campaigners to leave said that they wanted to return sovereignty to Parliament. But in fact by allowing a vote of 38% of the electorate to overturn a large majority in Parliament in favour of Remaining in the EU, the use of the vote to decide the future position of the UK in Europe and the world amounts to the biggest attack on parliamentary sovereignty since the 17th century.


One option was clear, the other encompassed contradictory aims

Second, the referendum was presented as a binary choice between Remain and Leave. But in fact while the choice to Remain was for a very clear known outcome, the choice to Leave opens at least two entirely different options. One is that the UK should remain a country of high immigration, but with the larger amount the comes from outside the EU being increased in relation to that from in the EU and with the UK moving forward on the basis of competition in open markets despite the evident costs to those left behind struggling in low wages and with inadequate public services. The other is of a country drastically reducing immigration so as to protect those with poor education and skills who have found it difficult to compete in open labour markets and have lost jobs due to competition from countries with much lower labour costs. If the referendum had separated these very sharply different visions of the future for the UK outside the EU and thus given the electorate three choices it is almost certain that Remain would have come out top of the three in a first post the post election. Even if the Alternative Vote system was used allowing a second choice to be used to decide between the two front runners it is very unlikely that most of those who voted for one Leave option (free labour and other markets as opposed to measures to protect British workers from competition) would have put the opposite option as their second choice.

The vote divides the generations

Third the referendum was intended as determining the future of the country for a period of 30 years or more, a very different proposition than a general election whose outturn lasts for a maximum of five years. The fact that all surveys show a large majority of those under 40 who will live longer with the consequences voted to Remain is an unacceptable binding of their future by an older generation.

Voters were misinformed in some cases deliberately

Fourth, the British people were misled and in several instances told outright lies by the Leave campaigns.

First, they were told that Turkey IS joining the EU in large posters prominently displayed. Turkey IS NOT joining the EU. Eleven years since negotiations opened in 2005 Turkey has completed only one of the 35 chapters which are preconditions for being considered for accession. Turkey as other countries can never join the EU without the parliamentary approval of every member country including not only the UK but also Germany, France and Austria where opposition to Turkish membership has traditionally been far greater than in the UK. (In fact British governments have long supported the principle of the possibility of Turkish membership and this position was not questioned by the Leave members of the British government before the referendum campaign).

There is no possibility in the near future that Turkey could come to a position in which member parliaments would be asked even to consider it for membership. This was a very distant prospect in 2010 and since then President Erdogan has made a large steps away from meeting EU membership criteria related to human rights, freedom of speech, rule of law and treatment of minorities. .


Second, the people were told that Leaving would give Britain control of its borders. In fact Britain has control of its borders: people coming into the country go through passport control. The UK can and has turned back people, including EU nationals,with criminal records or considered a threat to security. Whether the new electronic system is effective is open to question but that was always a choice only for the British government. To significantly strengthen such controls would require either a massive increase in border staff to subject travellers to intense scrutiny and long queues or some way of cutting the number of visitors.

Third, the Leave campaign’s battle bus was emblazoned with a statement that Britain would save £350m a month by leaving the EU and that this will be used to increase funding for the NHS. When Dr Sarah Wollaston, a Conservative MP and medical doctor, changed sides from Leave to Remain during the campaign in disgust at this flagrant lie, the Leave campaign announced that their position had not changed and the sum to go to the NHS remained on their bus. Immediately after the campaign it was dropped like a hot cake because they know that leaving the EU will save less than half the £350m and given other demands no government could afford to increase spending on the NHS to that extent without raising taxes.

Where now?

Those amongst the 48% who voted Remain who feel strongly about the matter should never accept the Referendum as a legitimate exercise of democratically accountable governance for the reasons given in the article and particularly because far from returning sovereignty to Parliament it critically undermines the sovereignty of Parliament by pressuring MPs to vote contrary to their own judgment on a matter of fundamental importance to the future of the country and possibly even the very existence of the country. One reason for non-acceptance is to try to prevent it acting as a precedent for referendums both in principle and in the manner of their conduct on other issues in the UK and across Europe.

However saying this provides little guidance of how Remainers should act in the coming months and years. Despite the reluctance of leading Brexiteers to move quickly to activate Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to set in motion divorce proceedings it remains probable that the UK or what remains of it will leave the EU in due course. It must require an Act of Parliament but probably enough MPs have promised to follow the referendum outcome rather than their own judgment so probably passing such an Act.


Maintaining any special access to single market will be difficult outside the EU

Then will follow negotiations on leaving and subsequent economic relations with the EU. The least bad outcome from the point of view of Remainers of such negotiations would be to retain substantial access to the single market. But this will be highly difficult to obtain. Since the UK will now refuse full access to the single market for other EU workers—given that this was the biggest substantive issue in the campaign, it must inevitably accept limitations on its own access to the market in the 27 remaining member states. A new government may still hope that it can negotiate access to important parts of the single market like financial services and the digital economy but it will not be at all easy. Any deal requires the agreement of every one of 27 countries all subject to their own pressures and lobbies. If the UK was negotiating with the German Industry Association (BDI) which has called for a good deal for the UK the task might be easy. But it is not. Even the German government if it had sole negotiating rights would want to maintain a rules-based single market, and Germany is not able to dictate to other countries despite the myth to that effect in the UK. With regard to euro zone bail-outs it has much power as the leading creditor but that power does not extend to other policy areas as seen in its attempt to push for a common sharing of refugees across the EU.

At present more access to the single market than countries like the US and Canada (in the present situation with as yet no TTIP) seems impossible as all EU countries and institutions are taking an all or nothing approach. In my opinion the other EU countries were a bit too rigid in what they allowed David Cameron in his renegotiations. However, there are in fact very good reasons for the EU’s apparent rigidity. The EU is not, as portrayed in the British media, a monolithic entity but a framework for achieving the very difficult task of enabling 28 independent member states to work and cooperate in some areas as well as compete fairly in others. The fear of those who want to hold the EU and its single market together is that, once one breach in a rulebook is made, there is a high risk that other countries will want their own exceptions eventually making the single market a shell with more holes than substance.

It seems that many Leave voters did see their vote as compatible with a close relationship with the single market. If such an agreement can be reached it could gain political and popular support in England and Wales, provided it included a significant restriction to free movement (probably a cap, a points system to cherry pick migrants would not be likely to be acceptable). However, if no such agreement can be reached, the UK will be faced with a stark choice of having at best the same access to the single market as the US or Canada, or and arrangement like Norway’s or Switzerland’s that does not achieve any of the major aims of Brexiteers. By then the impact of Brexit on the UK economy may be more visible especially if investors begin to expect no or few remaining privileges for the UK to be agreed.  Brexiteers might present this as the EU punishing the UK but in fact it would just reflect the normal self-interest of parties to any negotiations. It is precisely to overcome the stumbling blocks that arise when negotiations are based only on each country looking after its self -interest that the structures of the EU were created. The Conservative government should be held to account by pro-EU opposition parties – acting with at least some cooperation – for the consequences for the British economy of every disinvestment or other adverse consequence brought about by the referendum result.


The forgotten parts of England and Wales that turned the vote

One domestic aspect of the June 23rd vote is particularly notable . It was always expected that prosperous rural and many suburban areas that usually return Conservative MPs would vote Leave. What was less expected were the Leave majorities in poorer parts of England and Wales that have lost mining or manufacturing industry over the last 30 to 40 years. Most larger towns, apart from Birmingham, voted Remain. But smaller depressed post-industrial towns that have long been safe Labour constituencies voted Leave, a good example being the first significant Leave vote in Sunderland in the north-east, but included towns in the West Midlands, Lancashire, Yorkshire and South Wales. A Panorama programme on BBC on July 4th gave some glimpses of the way people in these towns feel. They feel left out and forgotten and the phrase “Give me my country back” appeared to resonate, but what do they mean by that? It appeared to be a nostalgia for when the towns were thriving manufacturing centres and the high streets full of local shops. There was almost nothing these respondents said in the programme that actually had anything to do with the EU, (such towns are not major magnets for immigration) but nevertheless they appeared not just to be giving a protest vote but to actually believe that leaving the EU would lead to a revival of their towns. Somehow it would seem that UKIP and possibly even Conservative campaigners found ways of raising such hopes. Such hopes are not going to be fulfilled by UKIP and probably not by the Conservatives, but others particularly Labour politicians cannot just wait and let them experience another disillusion. There does need to be concerted efforts made to give back hope to these towns. It should be based on encouraging local initiatives supported from outside. At least for another two years some outside money may continue to come from the EU.

The vote clearly reveals that many English and Welsh people are deeply discontented and implies that the UK’s apparent success in terms of job creation and low overall levels of unemployment hide a labour market which is not functioning as well as people in all major parties have believed. This applies both to areas of high immigration and economically-depressed areas. Minimum wages paid holidays and rights for part-time and temporary employees (some derived from EU legislation) need to be better enforced.

The question Where Now? has only been very partially addressed and will have to be addressed again in the future

Guest article by Mark Hudson: The Immigration Myth

Arguably, voting on June 23rd for most people will be dominated by fear. Either fear about the economy or fear about immigration. One of these will trump the other.

Of course there are lots of other issues, but when they are alone at the booth, faced with putting an ‘X’ in one space or another, most voters will fall back on what they fear most. Most people are not passionate about this issue one way or the other.

It is in this context that it is worth stressing that the real immigration issue in Britainif one is worried about immigration (which is not a major issue for me) – is immigration into the UK from non-EU countries. This key point has not been picked up by the Vote Remain camp.

These are the facts, sourced from government and anti-migration sources (see below).

1. Non-EU immigration accounts for more than half of immigration into the UK - which is entirely within the control of the UK Parliament, subject to national opinion.

The anti-migration website Migration Watch shows that even today more than half of immigrants into the UK still come from outside the EU (177,000 from non-EU in calendar 2015 against 170,000 from the EU.)

Between the 2001 and 2011 censuses the UK population grew from 58.8 million to 61.7 million. Over this time the non-EU born population grew by 1.5 million to 4.9 million (8% of the total) while the EU-born (excluding UK-born) population in the UK grew by 1.1 million to 2.6 million (4% of the population). So while immigration from the EU grew over this decade, the majority or 56% of the growth in the foreign-born UK population was due to the 1.5 million extra non-EU immigrants.

According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Labour Force Survey estimates for 2015, there are 3.3 million EU citizens in the UK – 1.6 million from the EU14, 1.3 million from the EU8, 300,000 from Romania and Bulgaria and the remainder from the other EU countries of Malta, Cyprus and Croatia[1]. There are 2.1 million UK citizens living in other EU countries ( so the net effect of EU migration is to increase the UK population by only 1.2 million.


2. The real cultural challenge is in integrating non-EU peoples.

I would argue that what is sparking most concern in the UK regarding immigration is the recent wave of Muslim immigrants into Europe (from Syria, Afghanistan and Africa), their relative lack of integration and the connection in many people’s minds with fanatic terrorism. This is allied to ongoing worries about the relative isolation of the large Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Somali and other Muslim communities in the UK.

There are now 3 million Muslims in the UK (5% of the total population), around half of whom were born in the UK. This is a fact which we cannot ignore or wish away, even if we were so inclined. The real challenge for the UK is how to welcome and facilitate the deeper integration of Muslims into UK life, involving compromise on both sides, and including full acceptance of key European values of tolerance, equal treatment of women and LGBTs, the paramountcy of secular law and respect for human rights.

However, this is completely irrelevant as far as the EU Referendum is concerned, since immigrants from the EU are from a European cultural and Christian heritage. There are no EU rules about non-EU migration and virtually no Muslim migrants from within the EU.


3. EU immigrants are not generally competing for housing

The majority of immigrants from EU countries do not compete with UK national for council accommodation, but go for private rented accommodation. This is because:

- they stay generally for less than 5 years (though of course others stay longer or permanently), and so it is not worth applying for council housing. Studies show that one third of EU immigrants return home after less than a year (typically, farm-workers, students, bar-istas) and more than half return home before they get to pension age.

- many are wealthier and/or get better paid jobs.


4. The NHS, schools and welfare would be worse off without EU immigrants

A persistent scare story is that EU immigrants are straining the UK’s health, welfare and education services.

This is simply wrong:

-       Study after study has shown that EU immigrants contribute much more in taxes than they take in benefits, and proportionately more so than UK citizens. The UK is a net gainer in budgetary terms. EU citizens come here overwhelmingly to work, not to scrounge or get healthcare.

-       EU immigrants help support the NHS since they contribute more taxes; and two thirds are in work and so use the NHS less, proportionately, than the UK-born or non-EU born populations. It should be  added that the NHS would also be much worse off without non-EU immigrants, who make up a big chunk of the workforce

-       EU immigrants arrive having left school and often are university-educated, so they are not using the education system. EU students are of course paying their way (through the nose).

-       EU immigrants are for the most part better educated than the UK average and therefore have a broadly positive impact on the quality of the UK workforce.


Sources:; various FT articles;; the ONS.

[1] The ONS Labour market statistics estimate that of the EU born migrants in the UK, 2.1 million were working.




To remain or leave: the case to stay taking account of arguments to leave

One argument of leave campaign is not true

A letter which I have recently received from Leave.EU, and has presumably been sent to millions of other potential voters, starts with a statement which is not true, namely that “in 1975 we voted for a Free Trade Area known then as the Common Market”. Although the sub-clause that it was informally called the Common Market is true, the reality is that the UK had previously been a member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) which consisted of six countries, the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland, before it joined what was then  the European Economic Community. The EFTA countries including the UK had Free Trade arrangements with the EEC so in effect the UK was already part of a wider free trade area. It specifically decided to leave the free trade area in order to join the EEC because the EEC had moved to a deeper degree of economic integration, which was underpinned by profound political commitment aimed at making war between its member states impossible. One motivation in the UK for joining was that the deeper level of economic integration was perceived as a reason for the much faster growth—at the time—of the six original EEC member states that that of the UK. But many supporters of entry in the UK also believed in the political purpose of the EEC, not least the prime minister of the time Ted Heath who had experienced war between European countries first hand. If the UK was merely entering a slightly different form of Free Trade Area than the one of which it was already a member, how could it have inspired the passionate opposition of prominent politicians like Enoch Powell and Tony Benn?

But complete honesty is not easy for either side in this campaign

It is not just important  that this Leave.EU statement is untrue but also that it takes a leading role in their campaign. Regrettably the long campaign with proponents of each side scraping around for something new to motivate potential voters is likely to lead to more and more assertions whose truth is at least tendentious and at worst completely absent.  Although this post is passionately committed to the UK remaining part of the EU, it will attempt to respect the truth and separate opinion from fact.

EU membership does have its costs

There are three main arguments used by opponents of EU membership. These are the budgetary cost, the inability to reduce immigration from other EU member states and the loss of sovereignty. They are all valid ones. EU membership is not a free lunch. However, all three are being routinely exaggerated by many on the Leave side.

The budgetary cost in net terms is about £7bn a year, 0.5% of GDP or 1.2% of public expenditure. It is normally presented in gross terms by EU opponents which is about double the figure but the absence of EU expenditure in the UK would have consequences if not replaced which and these consequences are not spelled out by the Leave campaign. For example would the UK government decide that farmers who have received substantial public funding since well before the UK joined the EEC, be left to sink or swim with EU funding not replaced at all? Would scientific and technological research funding (the UK receives more such funding than in other EU member state) be slashed?

According to official figures which are based on samples and so not precise net immigration to the UK is running at around at around 325,000 a year, of which about 175,000 comes from the EU, which is a reasonable concern given we are already quite densely populated. About 190,000 come from outside the EU and therefore would not be affected directly by leaving the EU. Given that there is substantial net inward immigration from outside the EU due to such factors as family reunions and business needs for highly skilled personnel, it is reasonable to suppose that unless there was a deliberate policy of discrimination against the EU, there would be substantial inward net migration from the EU even if the UK left as long as the relative job-creating dynamic of the British economy continued. Nevertheless leaving the EU would make it possible to reduce net inward EI migration by 50-100,000 a year. This would not be likely to reduce pressure on the health and care sectors since some of the people excluded would be likely to include those coming to work as doctors, nurses, other hospital workers or carers. Nor would it relieve pressure on housing since many workers from eastern Europe work in the building sector. It would however help a little to reduce pressure on school places and also a little on the need to build on green spaces.

The third argument about sovereignty is a valid one in terms of principle but much less so in terms of its practical impact. The theoretical underpinning of the EU, and its predecessors, since 1951, has been based on the idea of a pooling of national sovereignty to make war between member states impossible. Those who believe that national sovereignty is a principle that overrides other policy aims could never have supported UK membership in the 1970s and could not have done so whatever David Cameron had been able to achieve in renegotiating the terms of membership. However, the practical impact of EU legislation on individuals and businesses is hugely exaggerated. In most areas of health and safety legislation the UK goes further than required by EU law. On environmental legislation few people are calling for dirtier bathing or drinking water or more air pollution. There is a long list of supposed regulations interfering with daily life from children playing with balloons to women’s institutes recycling jam jars, but most on close examination turns out to be either a complete invention or an addition to EU requirements made by British lawmakers or officials. Indeed I am not aware of any such complaint that has real substance, though some probably do exist since the EU is certainly not perfect.

Political arguments are more important for those with strongest views, but economic ones may sway more voters

Given that there are costs to membership, what are the arguments for paying those costs? They are both economic and political. In my opinion, the political arguments are the more important, but the economic arguments may sway more voters. Attempts have been made by various studies to quantify the economic impact on output and jobs of leaving, in contrast to remaining. However, there are so many variables involved that any such estimate is really little more that an informed guess. It is better to try to analyse the impact and let the reader draw his or her conclusions. Opponents of EU membership assert that it will be possible to negotiate a free trade area. This may be true as affects goods trade. There is no very good reason why the EU should impose tariffs on UK exports if the UK does not do so on EU exports to the UK. However, if the possibility of anti-dumping duties was to be avoided there would have to be rules on state aids. There would also be a risk that some of the non-tariff barriers due to discriminatory regulation which existed before 1986 could re-emerge.

Lack of single market would most affect services exports

The clearest change would be that there would no longer be a single market in the provision of services. The legal provisions needed to enable free trade in financial, legal, accounting, engineering, IT, architecture and other services have proven substantial and 24 years after the supposed completion of the single market programme, many barriers have been removed but there is much still to be done. What can be said is that leaving the single market would mean that the process of removing barriers to services trade between the UK and the rest of the EU would be reversed instead of continuing if the UK remained in the single market. It is possible to leave the EU while still being in the single market as is the case with Norway and to a large extent with Switzerland, but in order to remain in the single market, these countries must implement EU legislation, allow free movement of people and pay into the EU budget. Since the absence of these are the main arguments for leaving the EU, it would make little sense to leave the EU but remain in the single market. Services trade would therefore be adversely affected, also because British citizens would no longer be free to work in the EU.

The view of businesses

That is the broad picture. In detail the experience of EU membership is different for every different type of business dealing with conditions and regulations relevant to it. There does appear to be a very large majority of businesses which want to stay in the EU. From the CBI 80% favour staying in and 5% want to leave. Admittedly the CBI is an overtly pro-EU organization. The Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) is more neutral. Even so its policy director, Mike Cherry states on the FSB website that : “Small firms seek measures to boost cross-border trade and economic growth – the completion of the single market, simplification of VAT, a smarter approach to regulation and protection of the opt-out under the Working Time Directive”. The completion of the single market would not be possible outside the EU and it is hard to see how cross-border trade could be boosted. The opt-out from the Working Time Directive is protected and inside the UK has had success in pushing for smarter regulation (the volume of new legislation being proposed by the present Commission has been greatly reduced compared to previous ones) and can work to simplify VAT. The latest survey of members by the British Chambers of Commerce, which is also neutral as an organisation, shows 59.5% intend to vote to remain while 30.1% intend to vote to leave.

Ultimately, it is the ability of the UK to influence the political future of Europe that is in question

The political argument in favour of staying in the EU is the most important one. For those whose ideal is a theoretically sovereign UK acting on its own to protect its interests in a globalised world, economic costs are worth paying. The case in favour of EU membership is that we will have an ongoing role in an endeavour that has achieved 70 years of peace and a fair degree of prosperity. Whether a member or not, what happens in countries across the Channel is bound to matter for the UK. NATO, which is mentioned by EU membership opponents as an alternative, is an alliance designed to defend its members against potential outside threats but it is not able to make a significant contribution to stable and harmonious relations between its own members. In addition, the UK can exercise more influence on the world beyond the EU’s frontiers by working with neighbours than trying to act on its own. It is true that the influence that the EU has been able to exert to spread peace and stability beyond its borders towards the east and south has recently been a failure. But to start to unravel the EU’s own structure would risk undermining any chance of coherent policies.

With the EU in crisis Commission and other member states should show more solidarity with Greece

 Asylum crisis threatens to weaken EU 

In an interview with the BBC, Manuel Valls, the French prime minister, said that the EU itself was under threat from the crisis posed by pressure of refugee seekers. This on the face of it would seem exaggerated. If some member states are more generous than others in accepting refugees why should that undermine their capacity to work together within the framework of the EU treaties? The Schengen system of borderless travel across most EU member states has already partially broken and could completely break down as member states try to stop or regulate the flows of external migrants. This is a serious blow given the impact of the Schengen agreement on everyday life and symbolism in breaking down barriers. It does not mean that end of the EU, but the fact that people like Mr Valls are talking in these terms is evidence of a deep crisis.


At a time of several other difficulties 

The challenge of the asylum seekers is highlighting the differences between and within EU countries and comes on top of several other problems. One of these is the forthcoming UK referendum on whether to stay in the EU, with UK opinion polls suggesting that those likely to vote to stay in or leave are quite evenly divided. A vote to leave would deprive the EU of a major player, which has made a particularly important contribution to the development of the EU’s single market. Furthermore its departure would set a precedent, which would give impetus to anti-EU sentiment on other countries where it is already strong including France, Italy and Poland.

Another major problem is posed by the fact that some of the countries that acceded to the EU in 2004, notably Poland and Hungary have weakened their compliance with political criteria under which they were allowed to join, such as the impartial rule of law, as for example in the packing of Poland’s constitutional court with its own sympathisers by the newly elected Law and Justice government. The attempt by the European Commission to monitor such measures has provoked increased hostility to the EU in Poland and Hungary, and this has become meshed up in hostility to the EU’s strongest country, Germany.

A third problem is the euro zone crisis. Although the threatened departure of Greece from the euro zone was averted last year there are still considerable tensions between countries of the south with high debts and northern countries. Recently there has been an increase in tensions between Italy on the one hand and Germany and the European Commission on the other.

Differences over how to tackle the refugee influx is exacerbating the other differences. There is no simple answer: one policy extreme would mean that the EU abandons any pretence to stand up for human rights of those not already EU residents; the opposite of free entry for all genuine refugees would create unsupportable social and political tensions even in countries like Germany with an initially welcoming attitude. A muddled middle way is the only one that can hope to avoid one or other such consequence.


Commission takes wrong approach to Greece

But there are ways in which the EU could do better. In particular the key role of Greece in the crisis should be acknowledged. On January 27th the Commission published a report highly critical of Greece, threatening to expel in from the Schengen zone if it did not do better. This followed a proposal to help Macedonia man its frontier with Greece without consulting the Greek government. Even if the Greek economy were not experiencing the most severe economic crisis any member state has experienced since the early days of the EU, it or any other country would struggle to cope in a humane manner with the huge numbers crossing the sea onto Greek islands. In contrast to the Commission’s attitude a group of academics have put forward islanders that have rescued and helped refugees forward has a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize.


Greece should be praised for what it has done rather than rebuked for what it has not done, and given far more funding to help it manage camps and processing centres to separate refugees from economic migrants and provide migrants in Greece with basic needs in the meantime. It may be that it is will be no longer practical to keep fully open frontiers with Greece given the amount of migrants arriving there, but this should not be portrayed as a punishment but rather as an unavoidable necessity in which Greece needs far more support from its partners.